"""Tests for credential exclusion + secret scrubbing during profile export. Profile exports should NEVER include auth.json or .env — these contain API keys, OAuth tokens, and credential pool data. Users share exported profiles; leaking credentials in the archive is a security issue. Secret-shaped strings that sneak into skills / persona / memory text are force-redacted in the staged archive (same pass as sessions --redact). The live profile on disk must stay untouched. """ import tarfile import pytest from agent.file_safety import HOME_CREDENTIAL_DIRS from hermes_cli.profiles import export_profile from plugins.teams_pipeline.store import DEFAULT_TEAMS_PIPELINE_STORE_FILENAME # Long enough to match agent.redact prefix patterns (sk- + 10+ chars). _LEAKED_KEY = "sk-or-v1-reallyLongSecretKeyValue12345678" def _patch_named_profile(monkeypatch, profiles_root, profile_dir): monkeypatch.setattr("hermes_cli.profiles._get_profiles_root", lambda: profiles_root) monkeypatch.setattr("hermes_cli.profiles.get_profile_dir", lambda n: profile_dir) monkeypatch.setattr("hermes_cli.profiles.validate_profile_name", lambda n: None) # Stores named here as well as in PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_PATHS, so dropping one from the list fails a test: # the loaders' and writers' own file names (.op.env and npmrc have no suffix the scrub edits). _EXTRA_STORES = { ".op.env", "npmrc", "honcho.json", "google_chat_user_token.json", "google_chat_user_oauth_pending", "workspace/meetings/node_token.json", "weixin/accounts", ".copilot_jwt.json", "proxy", "chrome-debug", "home/.git-credentials", "home/.config/gh/hosts.yml", "backups", "state-snapshots", DEFAULT_TEAMS_PIPELINE_STORE_FILENAME, "mem0.json", "browser-profiles/live/Default/Cookies", "browser_profiles/default/Default/Login Data", "mcp-tokens/srv.json", "vault/vault.key", "platforms/pairing/approved.json", "slack_tokens.json", "webhook_subscriptions.json", ".ssh/id_rsa", ".aws/credentials", ".gnupg/x", ".kube/config", ".envrc", } # Single-file stores whose name has no dot; every other dotless store is a token directory. _DOTLESS_FILES = {"npmrc"} # Dot-named stores that are directories: the OS credential dirs shared with file_safety. _DOT_DIRS = set(HOME_CREDENTIAL_DIRS) def _seed_stores(root): """Lay every credential store into a profile-shaped tree at *root*; returns their paths.""" from hermes_cli.profiles import PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_PATHS stores = _EXTRA_STORES | PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_PATHS (root / "platforms").mkdir(parents=True) (root / "config.yaml").write_text("model: gpt-4\n") (root / "platforms" / "keep.json").write_text("{}") for rel in stores: is_dir = rel in _DOT_DIRS or ("." not in rel.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] and rel not in _DOTLESS_FILES) target = root / rel / "store" if is_dir else root / rel target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) target.write_text("fake-credential") return stores class TestCredentialExclusion: def test_named_profile_export_excludes_auth(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch): """Named profile export must not contain auth.json or .env.""" profiles_root = tmp_path / "profiles" profile_dir = profiles_root / "testprofile" profile_dir.mkdir(parents=True) # Create a profile with credentials (profile_dir / "config.yaml").write_text("model: gpt-4\n") (profile_dir / "auth.json").write_text('{"tokens": {"access": "sk-secret"}}') (profile_dir / ".env").write_text("OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-secret-key\n") (profile_dir / "SOUL.md").write_text("I am helpful.\n") (profile_dir / "memories").mkdir() (profile_dir / "memories" / "MEMORY.md").write_text("# Memories\n") _patch_named_profile(monkeypatch, profiles_root, profile_dir) output = tmp_path / "export.tar.gz" result = export_profile("testprofile", str(output)) # Check archive contents with tarfile.open(result, "r:gz") as tf: names = tf.getnames() assert any("config.yaml" in n for n in names), "config.yaml should be in export" assert any("SOUL.md" in n for n in names), "SOUL.md should be in export" assert not any("auth.json" in n for n in names), "auth.json must NOT be in export" assert not any(".env" in n for n in names), ".env must NOT be in export" def test_named_export_ships_no_credential_store_or_copy_of_one(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch): """No credential store (any case spelling) and no copy Hermes' own writers leave of one (pre-update zip, update snapshot, config backup, migration .bak, corrupt auth.json) reaches a named-profile export. .op.env, npmrc, home/ CLI stores and the .bak copies have no suffix the scrub edits, so exclusion is their only guard; a hand-named config copy is the user's and ships scrubbed.""" from hermes_cli.auth import _load_auth_store from hermes_cli.backup import create_pre_update_backup, create_quick_snapshot from hermes_cli.config_backups import backup_config from hermes_cli.post_update import _backup_existing from hermes_cli.profiles import PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_PATHS profiles_root = tmp_path / "profiles" profile_dir = profiles_root / "testprofile" _seed_stores(profile_dir) (profile_dir / "config.yaml").write_text(f"model:\n api_key: {_LEAKED_KEY}\n") (profile_dir / "config.yaml.bak-my-note").write_text(f"model:\n api_key: {_LEAKED_KEY}\n") (profile_dir / "GOOGLE_CHAT_USER_TOKENS").mkdir(exist_ok=True) (profile_dir / "GOOGLE_CHAT_USER_TOKENS" / "upper.json").write_text("fake-credential") nested = [f"skills/s/{r}" for r in (".ssh/id_rsa", ".aws/credentials", ".gnupg/x", ".kube/config", ".envrc", ".docker/config.json", ".azure/accessTokens.json", ".config/gh/hosts.yml", ".config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json")] for rel in [*nested, "skills/s/.config/other/settings.json"]: (profile_dir / rel).parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) (profile_dir / rel).write_text("fake-credential") monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(profile_dir)) copies = [ create_pre_update_backup(hermes_home=profile_dir), profile_dir / "state-snapshots" / create_quick_snapshot(hermes_home=profile_dir), backup_config(profile_dir / "config.yaml", "setup"), *_backup_existing((profile_dir / ".env", profile_dir / "config.yaml")).values(), ] _load_auth_store(profile_dir / "auth.json") # "fake-credential" is not JSON: quarantined copies.append(profile_dir / "auth.json.corrupt") assert all(c and c.exists() for c in copies), copies _patch_named_profile(monkeypatch, profiles_root, profile_dir) with tarfile.open(export_profile("testprofile", str(tmp_path / "export.tar.gz")), "r:gz") as tf: members = {m.name: m for m in tf.getmembers()} note = tf.extractfile("testprofile/config.yaml.bak-my-note").read().decode() # The default profile's root allow-list keeps skills/, so its nested copies need the same drop. with tarfile.open(export_profile("default", str(tmp_path / "default.tar.gz")), "r:gz") as tf: default_members = set(tf.getnames()) assert {"testprofile/config.yaml", "testprofile/platforms/keep.json"} <= set(members) assert "default/config.yaml" in default_members assert "default/skills/s/.config/other/settings.json" in default_members assert "testprofile/skills/s/.config/other/settings.json" in members assert _LEAKED_KEY not in note rels = {*_EXTRA_STORES, *PROFILE_CREDENTIAL_PATHS, "google_chat_user_tokens/upper.json", *nested, *(c.relative_to(profile_dir).as_posix() for c in copies)} folded = {n.casefold() for n in (*members, *default_members)} leaked = sorted(f"{p}/{r}" for p in ("testprofile", "default") for r in rels if any( n == f"{p}/{r}".casefold() or n.startswith(f"{p}/{r}/".casefold()) for n in folded)) assert not leaked, leaked @pytest.mark.parametrize("declare_owned", [False, True]) def test_distribution_can_neither_plant_nor_replace_a_store(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch, declare_owned): """A distribution never installs a credential store or a recovery copy of one, nested ones included, whether it ships the whole payload or names each store in ``distribution_owned``, while a sibling such as ``platforms/keep.json`` still installs. An update that ships a FILE where the profile has a directory holding stores is refused before anything is written.""" from pathlib import Path from hermes_cli.profile_distribution import ( DistributionError, DistributionManifest, install_distribution, write_manifest, ) monkeypatch.setattr(Path, "home", lambda: tmp_path) (tmp_path / ".hermes").mkdir() monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(tmp_path / ".hermes")) stores = _seed_stores(tmp_path / "v1") | {"auth.json.corrupt", ".env.bak-20260928T084018Z", "config.yaml.bak-20260928T084018Z"} for copy in ("auth.json.corrupt", ".env.bak-20260928T084018Z", "config.yaml.bak-20260928T084018Z"): (tmp_path / "v1" / copy).write_text("fake-credential") # PLATFORMS/PAIRING: on a case-insensitive filesystem that spelling IS the pairing store. owned = sorted(stores | {r.split("/")[0] for r in stores} | {"SOUL.md", "PLATFORMS/PAIRING"}) if declare_owned else [] def stage(label, soul): staged = tmp_path / label staged.mkdir(exist_ok=True) (staged / "SOUL.md").write_text(soul) write_manifest(staged, DistributionManifest(name="dist", version="0.1.0", distribution_owned=owned)) return staged installed = install_distribution(str(stage("v1", "v1")), name="dist").target_dir assert (installed / "platforms" / "keep.json").exists() planted = sorted(r for r in stores if any( f.is_file() and f.read_text() == "fake-credential" for f in ((installed / r), *((installed / r).rglob("*") if (installed / r).is_dir() else ())))) assert not planted, planted live = [installed / "platforms" / "pairing" / "approved.json", installed / "platforms" / "whatsapp" / "session" / "creds.json"] for store in live: store.parent.mkdir(parents=True) store.write_text("installer-credential") for shipped_file in ("platforms", "platforms/whatsapp"): update = stage(f"v2-{shipped_file.count('/')}", "v2") (update / shipped_file).parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) (update / shipped_file).write_text("not a directory") with pytest.raises(DistributionError): install_distribution(str(update), name="dist", force=True) assert [s.read_text() for s in live] == ["installer-credential"] * 2 assert (installed / "SOUL.md").read_text() == "v1" # A store's ancestor shipped as a directory is merged, not replaced whole: the installer's # platforms/whatsapp/session survives an update that ships platforms/whatsapp/config.json. update = stage("v2-dir", "v2") (update / "platforms" / "whatsapp").mkdir(parents=True) (update / "platforms" / "whatsapp" / "config.json").write_text("{}") install_distribution(str(update), name="dist", force=True) assert (installed / "platforms" / "whatsapp" / "config.json").exists() assert [s.read_text() for s in live] == ["installer-credential"] * 2 class TestExportSecretScrub: def test_named_profile_export_redacts_secrets_in_text(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch): """Leaked keys in skills / SOUL / memories must not leave the archive.""" profiles_root = tmp_path / "profiles" profile_dir = profiles_root / "scrubme" profile_dir.mkdir(parents=True) soul = profile_dir / "SOUL.md" soul.write_text(f"My key is {_LEAKED_KEY}\n") skill_dir = profile_dir / "skills" / "demo" skill_dir.mkdir(parents=True) skill = skill_dir / "SKILL.md" skill.write_text( "---\nname: demo\ndescription: Demo.\n---\n" f"Use OPENROUTER_API_KEY={_LEAKED_KEY}\n" ) memories = profile_dir / "memories" memories.mkdir() memory = memories / "MEMORY.md" memory.write_text(f"token {_LEAKED_KEY}\n") (profile_dir / "config.yaml").write_text("model: gpt-4\n") _patch_named_profile(monkeypatch, profiles_root, profile_dir) result = export_profile("scrubme", str(tmp_path / "scrubme.tar.gz")) with tarfile.open(result, "r:gz") as tf: members = { name: tf.extractfile(name).read().decode("utf-8") for name in tf.getnames() if name.endswith((".md", ".yaml")) } blob = "\n".join(members.values()) assert _LEAKED_KEY not in blob assert any("SOUL.md" in n for n in members) assert any("SKILL.md" in n for n in members) assert any("MEMORY.md" in n for n in members) # Live profile must keep the original plaintext. assert _LEAKED_KEY in soul.read_text() assert _LEAKED_KEY in skill.read_text() assert _LEAKED_KEY in memory.read_text() @pytest.mark.require_symlinks def test_export_redacts_through_symlink_without_touching_source( self, tmp_path, monkeypatch ): """Symlinked skill text is redacted in the archive, source file stays put.""" profiles_root = tmp_path / "profiles" profile_dir = profiles_root / "linkme" profile_dir.mkdir(parents=True) outside = tmp_path / "outside-skill.md" outside.write_text(f"secret {_LEAKED_KEY}\n") skill_dir = profile_dir / "skills" / "linked" skill_dir.mkdir(parents=True) link = skill_dir / "SKILL.md" link.symlink_to(outside) (profile_dir / "config.yaml").write_text("model: gpt-4\n") _patch_named_profile(monkeypatch, profiles_root, profile_dir) result = export_profile("linkme", str(tmp_path / "linkme.tar.gz")) with tarfile.open(result, "r:gz") as tf: skill_members = [n for n in tf.getnames() if n.endswith("SKILL.md")] assert skill_members archived = tf.extractfile(skill_members[0]).read().decode("utf-8") assert _LEAKED_KEY not in archived assert _LEAKED_KEY in outside.read_text() assert link.is_symlink()